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Non-Oil Exports, Economic Growth and
Macroeconomic Stability
T. Ademola Oyejide •
Introduction
he topic that I was asked to write about is "Stimulating Non- Oil Exports for
Revenue Generation During Economic Downturn". In the process of
preparing this paper, it became clear to me first that increased non-oil
exports would not necessarily make up for the fall in government revenue
arising from the oil price slump and second that increased non-oil exports
would be critical for economic growth under all circumstances. Based on this
assessment, I have chosen to examine the role of non-oil exports in promoting
economic growth and development in the medium to long-term context, and
in enhancing macroeconomic stability in the short-term context. In both
cases, the Central Bank has important policy responsibilities to carry out. In
addition, both cases should be jointly addressed for at least two reasons. Rrst,
the policy instruments required for both are either the same or are closely
related. Second, the decisions taken for maintaining short-run
macroeconomic balance typically have implications for the medium to longterm economic growth and development outcomes as well.

I.

T

In the rest of this paper, Section 2, discusses the role of non-oil exports in the
structural transformation and sectoral diversification processes which are
inherently associated with sustainable growth and development. In Section 3,
the focus of the analysis shifts to an examination of the role of non-oil exports
in the context of short-term macroeconomic management. Effective and
productive policy making over the short-, medium- and long-term must take
account of the necessity for managing the inevitable policy trade-offs that will
be confronted. This constitutes the focus of Section 4. The paper concludes in
Section 5.
II.
Structural Transformation and Sectoral Diverslflcatfon
Structural transformation of an economy occurs with the reallocation of
resources across different sectors and products. The process of struc tural
transformation is driven by differences in sectoral productivity. In particular,
the structural transformation process is growth- and development-enhancing
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when it involves resource shifts from lower to higher productivity sectors or subsectors. In comparison, diversification represents the shift to a more varied
structure manifested by the introduction of new products, higher quality
products, or the expansion of existing ones. Diversification can occur in the
forms of output and export. In the former case, it is called domestic sector
output diversification or the production of a wider range of products. In the
latter case of exports, diversification can occur either in the form of a wider
range of products exported or in the form of exports to a larger number of
export markets or trading partners. In general, countries achieve higher levels
of export diversification when their export revenues are generated from a
wide mix of export products and trading partners. In the early stages of a
country's economic development, structural transformation and sectoral
diversification are likely to be closely linked. Thus, the development process of
the typical low-income country begins from specialisation in a narrow range
of primary commodity activities, such as agriculture and mining. Structural
transformation, from this base, through reallocation of resources would
probably involve diversification into broader production and export structures.
Economic theory asserts and the historical experiences of many countries
confirm that structural transformation and sectoral diversification are
necessary for ensuring that economic growth is sustainable and inclusive. In
particular, structural transformation and sectoral diversification play important
roles in influencing the macroeconomic performance of developing
countries. Diversification of domestic production exports facilitate faster
growth and greater macroeconomic stability.
Many of the success stories of structural transformation and sectoral
diversification processes that have generated rapid and sustained economic
growth and development have been based on sectoral diversification in
favour of manufacturing industry which exhibit many growth enhancing
features. It is more productive than other sectors: tends to be labour-intensive,
especially in the early stages of industrialisation and hence, can absorb the
increasing labour supply shed by the agricultural sector. Manufacturing is
associated with greater product sophistication which causes higher per
capital growth in output; and the broader diversification potentials in the
manufacturing sector that tend to cushion price volatility. As a result of these
features, the economies of many of the countries that have successfully
achieved sustainable economic growth and development based on
structural transformation and sectoral diversification are associated with
increasing share of the manufacturing sector in GDP as well as rising share of
manufactured exports goods in total exports.
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Nigeria aspired to achieve similar result between the 1960 and mid-l 970s by
adopting an import substitution industrialisation strategy (ISi) as a means of
diversifying the economy away from agriculture. But there were two fatal
policy errors. First, the success conditions associated with ISi were not met.
These conditions include selection of the beneficiary industries on the basis of
their specific features, granting of protec_tion over a limited duration and
subject to clear performance standards, and readiness to remove protection
when the performance standards are not met. In actual practice, tariff
protection was routinely granted to all indefinitely and without any analysis of
their growth enhancing features. Second, the use of ISi strategy has an in-built
weakness relating to its demand for foreign exchange. While protection from
foreign competition which typically applies to the domestic production of final
consumer products can save foreign exchange, the foreign exchange
requirements for the import of raw materials. semi-processed inputs and
capital goods (machinery, etc.) tend to increase with volume of production.
This is why ISi must be export-oriented. In actual practice. Nigeria's
manufacturing sector was not designed to be export-oriented. Its generous
protection and other incentives focused on meeting domestic demand.
The emergence and immediate dominance of oil from the mid-19705
ultimately struck the final blow. Since it provided an immediate source of
foreign exchange, it appeared to solve the problem of the manufacturing
sector's increasing demand for foreign exchange to meet its raw materials
and other input requirements. But due to the volatility of global oil prices, this
problem continued to surface and to periodically cripple the manufacturing
sector by drastically reducing its capacity utilisation. This has done serious
damage to the dynamic growth of Nigeria's manufacturing sector. But it, in
fact. represents a minor irritation compared to the second problem.
This second problem emanates from what the literature calls the "Dutch
Disease". When an economy has a dominant and booming tradable sector
(such as oil) which brings into the economy huge amounts of capital inflows.
the economy's equilibrium real exchange rate tends to appreciate! This
means that the external value (in terms of foreign currencies) of the domestic
currency rises. This, in turn, means that the prices of tradable imports are lower
in the domestic market, while the domestic exports are higher in price in
foreign markets. As a result. the domestically produced goods find it more
difficult to compete with imported products in the domestic market and
virtually impossible to compete in export markets abroad. To some extent,
increased tariff protection and import prohibition may enable domestic
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producers to survive in the domestic market, but only at the expense of
domestic consumers whose welfare is reduced in the process.
As indicated earlier, the developing countries of the 1950s and 1960s which
were successful in achieving sustainable economic growth and development
through structural transformation and sectoral diversification are
characterised by two important features: large and increasing share of
manufacturing sector in GDP, and high and rising share of manufactured
exports goods in total exports. By comparison, Nigeria's output and trade
structures are deficient on both counts. More specifically, Nigeria's economy
features both a small and falling manufacturing sector output share of GDP
and a minimal and diminishing contribution of manufactured exports in total
exports. In effect, while Nigeria experienced fairly rapid economic growth
between 1995 and 2013, this performance was essentially driven by the oil
boom associated with the commodity super cycle of that period. The growth
episode was apparently not associated with structural transformation and
sectoral diversification.
More specifically and as the rebased GDP series shows, the contribution of
manufacturing sector to GDP remained in single digits at 6.6, 7.8, 7.8 and 9.3
per cent, in 2010, 2011 , 2012 and 2013, respectively. In terms of structure,
Nigeria's manufacturing sector's output is dominated by low-level technology.
Over the period of 2010-2012, the food, beverages and tobacco (FBT} subsector accounted for an average of 66.8 per cent of total manufacturing
sector's output.
This was followed by textiles, apparel and footwear (TAF) sub-sector's average
share of 14.3 per cent; and that of other manufacturing (OM) sub-sector's
average contribution of 6.9 per cent over the same period. Thus, these three
sub-sectors accounted for an average of 88.0 per cent of total output of
Nigeria's manufacturing sector. Furthermore, sugar's share of FBT's total output
was 42.9 per cent over the period, while that of bread was 23.4 per cent. Thus,
sugar and bread accounted for 66.3 per cent of the total output of FBT which,
in turn, accounted for 66.8 per cent of the total output of Nigeria's
manufacturing over the 2010-2012 period.
In the case of exports, the share of non-oil goods averaged 29 .6 per cent over
the same period. The poor performance of non-oil exports has its roots in the
corresponding adverse production incentives that are generated by the
effect of the capital inflows associated with the oil-boom which appreciated
the equilibrium real exchange rate. Due to the repressive effect of this on non-
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oil tradables, Nigeria's manufacturing sector has generally been unable to
take advantage of generous trade that Epstein (2006), associated with the
European Union in the context of the series of Lome Convention and Cotonou
Partnership Agreement since 1775, as well as that offered by the United States
through its African Growth and Opportunity Act {AGOA). In the specific case
of the AGOA whose preferential margins in the case of garments and
apparels were generous and fully utilised by other African countries, Nigeria 's
own policies constituted the major constraint. By imposing very high import
tariffs or prohibition of textiles, the incentive structure produced the result that
textiles accounted for an average of 91 .7 per cent of the TAF total output;
with garments and apparel accounting for only an average of 1.6 per cent
during the 2010-2012 period. The high tariff protection on textiles which
induced this output performance also had a price in the form of the
corresponding high cost of garments and apparel products that use textiles as
inputs. The African countries which took advantage of the generous
preference margins for garments and apparel succeeded because they also
took advantage of AGOA's permission for them to use the cheapest textile
inputs they could find. Nigeria' s tariff policy closed this route to Nigeria's
garment producers. Hence, while Nigeria was eligible to benefit from this
trade preference, its own self-inflicted wound made it impossible to do so.
This above analysis has several implications. First, the current industrial
development strategy has clearly failed. Its application over half a c entury
has produced a manufacturing sector which contributes little to GDP and
exports. The economy has achieved neither structural transformation nor
sectoral diversification without which sustainable growth and development
cannot be achieved. Second, it is important to identify and understand the
reasons why the current strategy is judged to have failed. It is easy to pinpoint
at least two reasons. One relates to its bastardisation in the process of
application through the sustained violations of virtually all of its success
conditions. The other is that the strategy's principal tool, i.e, import c ontrol
(through tariff or non-tariff measures) does not address the fundamental
source of the problem, i.e the "Dutch Disease"- induced real exchange rate
appreciation which persistently undermines the competitiveness of domestic
production.
To the extent that this diagnosis is correc t, a tempting recommendation would
be to scrap the current industrial development strategy completely and
immediately. But this will be "a bridge too far", and will amount to "throwing
the baby out with the birth water" . The more logical way to go is probably a
carefully re-designed and phased programme of ban, removal and tariff rate
reductions over a suitable period of time that is established on the basis of
more detailed analysis.
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The more positive recommendation is to transfer the industrial protection
mechanism from tariffs to the exchange rate. The exchange rate is a macro
price whose use in this context does not require the kind of product specific
selection that is associated with tariffs. This reduces its been captured by
powerful individuals or groups of producers. By comparison, the use of the
exchange rate tool requires that the exchange rate be market-determined in
the context of a managed float arrangement; while the Central Bank reserves
the right to intervene asymmetrically. That is, only when there is pressure (due
to rising capital inflows) to appreciate the exchange rate. The system would
assist in sustaining and enhancing the competitiveness of Nigerian non-oil
exports. In this arrangement, the lower the external value of the naira, the
more expensive will be Nigeria's imports, the cheaper will Nigeria's exports be
abroad, and the higher will be the per unit revenue of exports to domestic
producers. Yes, of course, the naira price of imported raw materials and other
inputs required by domestic manufactures will be higher as well as the naira
price of their output. But since these inputs constitute only a proportion of the
total cost of final output, the per unit profitability needs not be reduced.
The use of the exchange rate tool in this system is not without cost, of course. It
will, for example, require the Central Bank to accumulate and sterilise foreign
exchange reserves; a process that forfeits the return that could otherwise
have been earned if not sterilised.
Ill.

Short-Term Macroeconomic Management

In the context of the basic analytical framework, the primary objectives of
short- term macroeconomic management are to establish and continually
maintain both sets of the internal and external balances of an economy. A
significant oil price decline could pose serious challenges of short-term
macroeconomic management for oil-exporting developing countries
especially those that are heavily dependent on oil exports and whose
economies are, to that extent, undiversified. One of these challenges
emanates from the likelihood that, as a result of the oil price slump, oilexporting countries will earn less oil export revenue and their budgets will be
under pressure. Based on previous experience of large and unpredictable oil
price declines, these events typically have major impact on fiscal balances of
the affected countries. Even a small fall in oil price may generate a large
increase in their financing needs, since their exports are not diversified and oil
revenue accounts for a large proportion of total revenue. Thus, a mechanical
effect of an oil price decline is likely to be a fiscal deficit for most oil-exporting
developing countries.
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The fiscal deficit may, in turn, necessitate abrupt macroeconomic adjustments
in the short-term. But, in order to avoid the disruptive pains of such abrupt
adjustments, the affected countries may try to smooth out the adjustment by
not curtailing government expenditures immediately and to the extent
required for re-establishing internal balance. But for countries that lack
accumulated funds to finance the deficit, a larger real exchange rate
depreciation would be required. This could become problematic because a
strong monetary framework would be required to avoid the situation in which
the depreciation leads to persistently higher inflation and further depreciation.
There exists a second challenge that is posed for macroeconomic
management of oil-exporting developing economies by an oil price slump.
This derives from the fact that the oil price slump which reduces government
revenue also reduces export revenue which, in turn, may place external
balances under pressure. In the event that this happens, financial stability risks
would increase and significant pressure could be placed on the domestic
currency. This is the mechanism through which falling oil prices typically lead
to the depreciation of oil- exporters' currencies. If this depreciation is carefully
and effectively controlled, it should assist the affected oil-exporting
developing country to adjust smoothly and successfully. But things could go
wrong for at least two reasons. First, financial problems could be exacerbated
for the government and individual firms whose debts are denominated in
foreign currencies such as dollars. Second, if inflation expectations are not
well anchored, depreciations may become uncontrollable and thus lead
quickly to very high inflation. The fact that the adjustment processes required
for restoring both internal and external balances involve depreciation implies
considerable interactions across both. It also reveals the critical importance of
the exchange rate for the process of short-term macroeconomic
management.
A number of initial conditions and certain features of the policy framework
have been found to be helpful in ensuring an effective macroeconomic
management of the consequences of an oil price decline. As discussed
above, a major consequence of an oil price decline is an unanticipated
cash-flow shock. The ability of a country to absorb such a shock depends on
the strength and robustness of the government's financial position. If the
position is strong, the government would have the room to manoeuvre and
accommodate the cash-flow fluctuations through an appropriate mix of
adjustment and financing. This would enable the country to implement shortrun fiscal strategies which can be suitably focused at avoiding fiscal instability
while insulating the domestic economy from oil revenue volatility. Many oilexporting developing countries typically acquire this capacity by establishing
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policy cushions such as oil saving funds and fiscal rules which enable them to
save during periods of high oil prices with a view to using such saving to
sustain spending when lower oil prices occur. When successful, this strategy
ensures the decoupling of current spending from current earnings.
Both theory and evidence also suggest that the exchange rote regime
matters for the management of the adjustment associated with on oil price
decline in oil-exporting developing countries. More specifically, countries with
flexible exchange rote regimes con adjust through currency depreciations.
This process yields a smaller and smoother output response due to large and
immediate real exchange rote depreciation. In addition, there is less need for
contractionory fiscal policy because the real depreciation tends to exert on
adequate dampening role. In the case of fixed exchange rote regimes,
however, monetary policy is typically constrained and the major burden of
macroeconomic stabilisation falls upon fiscal policy. In effect, adjustment
typically requires substantial fiscal spending reductions which may tum out to
be particularly damaging for recovery and subsequent growth.
The patterns of oil price decline, impact on internal and external balances,
policy responses and their consequences ore largely mirrored by Nigeria's
experience over the previous five oil price decline episodes. Several issues
stand out, however. One of these is the continued inability of the country to
tome its generally pro-cyclical fiscal policy posture. Going forward, therefore,
the key policy imperatives should include the following elements:
•
•
•
•

pursuit of fiscal policy strategy aimed at breaking the procyclical response of expenditure to volatile oil prices
elimination of expansionary fiscal policy bias during oil booms
targeting prudent non-oil fiscal balances
reduction of the non-oil fiscal deficit gradually and
systematically over time.

These fiscal policy imperatives listed above are not new. In fact, they have
always been recognised and they constitute the justification for the
establishment of arrangements, lows and institutions such as the Excess Crude
Account, the Fiscal Responsibility Act, and Nigeria Sovereign Investment
Authority. If these had been allowed to work effectively, the era of procyclical fiscal policy could have ended and Nigeria would hove been in a
strong financial and fiscal position to adjust to the current oil price slump more
efficiently and with much less pain.
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The second issue relates to the role of export diversification. As argued in
section 2, structural transformation and sectoral diversification constitute key
elements of a dynamic process for generating sustainable and inclusive
economic growth. This process neither happens automatically nor does it
necessarily produce the desirable kind and extent of structural transformation
and sectoral diversification. Low-income countries of the 1950s and 1960s that
have successfully created vibrant and export-oriented manufacturing sectors
and, have achieved much higher levels of per capita inc ome and economic
development have done so largely by effectively deploying the exchange
rate policy tool.
In the context of oil price and revenue volatilities which create difficult
macroeconomic management problems for oil-dependent developingcountry economies, a more diversified export structure obviously has a role in
ameliorating these problems. While this amelioration would not necessarily
apply to a full extent in the case of government revenue, it should do so in the
case of strengthening the country's external balance position. Thus, an
exchange rate policy which focuses effectively on sustaining the
competitiveness of the domestic economy and, thus, promotes non-oil
exports can be expected to reduce the volatility of total exports as well as the
extent and cost of adjustment through contractionary fiscal policy.
IV.
Managing Polley Trade-Offs
In Sections 2 and 3 above the real exchange rate is recognised as the most
important factor which shapes the economy's incentive structure through the
movements of relative tradable and non-tradable product prices. In the
context of an oil dominated economy such as Nigeria, the resource reallocation effect of changes in the exchange rate can be particularly strong.
For example, it is well established in the literature on the "Dutch Disease" that
the exchange rate appreciates in response to surge in capital flows and that
this reduces the competitiveness of the capital-receiving country's exports.
The implication of this is that if Nigeria wishes to create and sustain a dynamic
and export-oriented non-oil sector, an appropriate policy intervention strategy
must be designed and implemented to effectively counteract this "natural"
tendency of exchange rate appreciation. The design and implementation of
such a policy intervention strategy must begin with the recognition that
tradeoffs often exist between policies and that these trade-offs need to be
understood so that they can be effectively managed. A very useful and
simple analytical scheme for this purpose is the Impossible Trinity or Trilemma, a
paradigm of open economy macroeconomics. In its simple form, this
paradigm asserts that it is impossible for a country to have all three of the
following at the same time:
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a stable foreign exchange rate
free capital movement (or absence of capital controls)
an independent monetary policy

When confronted with this Trilemma, policy makers have to select a
combination of any two because all the three goals can be mutually
inconsistent. For example, if a country chooses to maintain a fixed exchange
regime and decides to raise the interest rate in order to control inflation, this
will increase the difference between its own rate and the world interest rate.
Given the emerging arbitrage opportunity in open capital markets and the
underlying interest rate parity condition, such a move would attract capital
inflows into the domestic economy, and results in an appreciating pressure on
the fixed exchange. In order to eliminate this pressure and restore the fixed
exchange, the country would have to intervene in the foreign exchange
market to buy international reserves by selling domestic currency. This will end
up defeating the original objective of controlling domestic inflation.
A review of country experiences shows that some developed countries and
regions have tended to select the corner solution that the Trilemma implies.
Thus, the United States allows its exchange rate to vary in the context of open
capital markets while retaining an independent monetary polic y as its control
instrument. By comparison, the countries in the Euro-Zone component of the
European Union have chosen to give up monetary policy independence in
exchange for exchange rate stability and open capital markets.
Many other countries, including those of emerging markets, appear to have
chosen to move away from the corner solutions and towards the middle
ground. This seems to reflect the understanding that open capital markets are
associated with significant costs and benefits. On the side of benefits, open
capital markets permit capital flows which help to bridge the gap between
domestic saving and investment as well as productivity-enhancing
technology and skilled managerial capacity. On the cost side, unbridled
capital inflows can fuel inflationary pressures, fan asset price bubbles and
appreciate the exchange rate, thus reducing domestic competitiveness. In
addition, sudden reversals in capital flows can lead to instability, including
crises in financial and currency markets.
Thus, middle ground solutions tend to embrace gradual opening up of nondebt capital flows (principally foreign direct investment), while maintaining
some control over debt and portfolio capital flows. An example of such
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middle-ground policy making is presented by the experience of the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI). More specifically, the RBI intervenes in the foreign
exchange market in an asymmetric way; it generally intervenes only when the
exchange rate is appreciating, and adopts a "hands off" approach during
times of depreciation. This approach is capable of achieving three different
objectives. First, the depreciating currency assists in enhancing or restoring the
competitiveness of exports. Second, the deprecating currency helps to
ameliorate trends towards growing current account deficits. Third, it minimises
the risk of losing foreign exchange reserves.
Like India, several other emerging market economies operate in an
intermediate range of limited financial integration and managed floating
exchange rate regimes. In this context, their central banks actively intervene
in foreign exchange markets both to promote structural transformation and
sectoral diversification in the medium to long-term, and using reserve
management policies in the short-run to balance the trade-offs presented by
the Trilemma. In this context, reserve accumulation gives the policy makers
more flexibility in dealing with the short-run trade-offs between monetary
policy independence and exchange rate stability for a given level of capital
account openness. There is, of course, "no free lunch". This approach involves
an inherent disadvantage in terms of rising fiscal cost of reserve sterilisation. In
view of the multiple objectives of macroeconomic management such as
maintaining a robust and sustainable economic growth rate, manageable
current account deficit, competitive exchange rate, access to adequate
external capital for domestic investment, moderate inflation, and adequate
foreign exchange reserves, the process of macroeconomic management in
the context of significant policy trade-offs remains inherently complex; there is
unlikely to be a cost-less solution.
V.
Concluding Comments
The current oil price slump and its immediate effects of reduced government
revenue and export revenue will, no doubt, impose a costly and painful
adjustment process on the Nigerian economy. The appropriate approac h for
an effective management of this process in order to minimise the cost and the
pain will also continue to generate heated debate for quite a while, as
current projections suggest that oil prices may not return to the level before
the slump for roughly five years.

The volatility of oil prices is not new, and the current oil price fall will not be the
last. In addition, based on the experience of the previous five episodes, a lot is
known about the consequences of such oil price and revenue slumps. Based
on this knowledge, appropriate countervailing institutions have been created
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and relevant policy packages designed. The real tragedy for Nigeria may be
the inability to learn from experience and past mistakes so that adequate
preparation can be made for the future. That future is now.
There are studies which suggest that difficult periods such as this actually
provide both the challenge and opportunity to initiate and fast-track the
processes of structural transformation, sectoral diversification as well as the
enhanced capacity for a rational and effective management of the
economy. Perhaps this opportunity can be seized upon now. If this succeeds,
the mistakes of the previous five episodes could be forgotten a nd forgiven.
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